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I. INTRODUCTION
With the deterioration of Fidel Castro's health in recent years, the focus
of Cuban-Americans has once again been honed on the status of their real
property in Cuba-property confiscated in some manner by the Communist
Castro Regime. "In the years... following the rise of Fidel Castro," hun-
dreds of thousands of Cuban Citizens were forced to flee the island nation
with nothing but the clothing on their backs, escaping property seizures and
political pressure exercised by the Castro government.I These takings, ulti-
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mately, affected United States and Cuban citizens alike and, due to the nature
of the of the takings and the lack of compensation paid by the Castro gov-
ernment, these takings constituted clear violations of international law, hu-
man rights, and Cuba's Constitution of 1940.2 As such, when a future, post-
Castro Cuban government at long last throws off the shackles of communist
oppression and moves toward democracy, Cuba will undoubtedly be forced
by economic and political pressure to enter into negotiations with the United
States to resolve outstanding confiscated property claims from United States
citizens and Cuban-American Citizens.3 In that undertaking, a post-Castro
Cuban government should create a restitution and compensation policy with
specific guidelines and procedures to administer equitable remedies for "ex-
isting and potential property claims."4 Given the condition of Cuba's gov-
ernment, infrastructure, and economy at the present time, "a 'gradualist' ap-
proach to privatization is the only feasible solution as it allows the develop-
ment of a market economy that incorporates the socio-cultural and socio-
psychological [and economic] order of the country."5 Accordingly, this arti-
cle proposes a remediation policy, which presumptively proffers natural restitu-
tion as the preferred remedy for confiscated land claims and gradually "steps
down" to other remedies such as substitution of similar land and compensation
for the seized property.
While the Castro regime may have a definite end, "[h]ow or when the
'Castro [regime]' will end is purely a matter of speculation." 6 As such, this
Puente de Jivenes Profesionales Cubanos (Bridge of Young Cuban Professionals). B.A.,
Honors College, University of Miami. Special thanks to Nicolis Gutidrrez, Jr., Esq., Eloy
Cepero, member of the Board of Directors of the Cuban American National Foundation, and
Ralph Galliano of the Institute for U.S.-Cuba Relations for their insight and support in tack-
ling this endeavor to right the wrongs that have plagued Cuba for over fifty years and for
working towards a free and democratic Cuba.
1. Eduardo Moisds Peiialver, Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International
Norms, and the Property Reforms of the Cuban Revolution, 52 FLA. L. REv. 107, 108 (2000).
"Unable to carry their belongings with them, most of the Cuban refugees left with, as the...
saying goes, 'one hand in front and one hand behind."' Id
2. See generally id.
3. Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies in a Negotiated Settlement of the US.
Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 659, 659-60
(1996) [hereinafter Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies].
4. Oscar M. Garibaldi & John D. Kirby, Property Rights in the Post-Castro Cuban
Constitution, 3 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L. 225, 254 (1995).
5. Stuart Grider, A Proposal for the Marketization of Housing in Cuba: The Limited
Equity Housing Corporation-A New Form of Property, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 453,
460 (1996).
6. Jose A. Ortiz, The Illegal Expropriation of Property in Cuba: A Historical and Legal
Analysis of the Takings and a Survey of Restitution Schemes for a Post-Socialist Cuba, 22
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 321, 322 (2000).
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article must operate within certain established parameters. First, it is pre-
sumed Cuba will depart from its communist ways and adopt democratic
principles in the near future, so as to regain its economic footing in the
world. Second, this article presumes "Cuba will provide [redress] . . . to
those [individuals] whose property was [confiscated] by the [Castro govern-
ment] . . . and who have not yet received compensation for [such] taking[s]"
as it transitions to a free market.7 Third, there are three categories of claim-
ants that will benefit from such redress: "(1) Cuban nationals and exiles-
[a.k.a. Cuban-American Citizens]; (2) U.S. corporations and individuals; and
(3) foreign companies currently possessing [some kind of] ownership inter-
est[] in [the confiscated] propert[ies]." 8 The policy proffered in this article
will only apply to the first class of claimants, Cuban nationals, as they do not
yet have an avenue through which to seek redress for their property claims.
Fourth, while the term "restitution" has been used to encompass all forms of
redress for expropriations and confiscations, for purposes of this article the
term restitution should be considered "synonymous with the return of expro-
priated property to [a claimant]," either directly or indirectly. 9 Lastly, al-
though disparate views of the legality and effectiveness of confiscations by
Castro's regime exist-a topic which will be briefly discussed in this article,
this article will operate under the presumption that the confiscations of Cu-
ban property under the Castro government were ineffective either because
they were illegal takings under Cuban law or because the Castro government
failed to provide compensation for an effective taking in accordance with
Cuban law. 10
Despite the presumptions under which this article operates, the likeli-
hood of Cuba's transition to a free market democracy should be discussed,
taking a moment to highlight the difference between a transition from a post-
Castro government and a succession." A transition in Cuba will be evinced
by "[a] government defined by the presence of regularly scheduled, free and
fair elections [with] [g]overnment actions [that] promote and respect interna-
tionally accepted definitions of human rights and other democratic rights and
7. Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Some Legal and Practical Issues in the Resolution of Cuban
Nationals'Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 217, 217-18 (1995)
[hereinafter Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution]. See also Travieso-Diaz, Alternative
Remedies, supra note 3, at 660.
8. Ortiz, supra note 6, at 336.
9. Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 7, at 217 n. 1.
10. Id. at 227, 244.
11. See CREIGHTON U. ScH. OF LAW & DEPT. OF POL. Sci., REPORT ON THE RESOLUTION OF
OUTSTANDING PROPERTY CLAIMS BETWEEN CUBA & THE UNITED STATES 14 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter CREIGHTON REPORT].
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norms."'12 A succession, however, will be indicated by a continuation of the
current governmental regime in Cuba with simply a change in leaders within
the same organization.1 3 The United States undoubtedly favors a transition
and mandates; in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, that Cu-
ba convert'to a democracy in order to re-establish bilateral relations between
the United States and the island nation. 4 By all indications, Cuba is heading
towards a succession as Fidel Castro has already seamlessly passed power to
his brother, Raiil Castro, as of July 31, 2006.15 "[T]he succession has pro-
ceeded in an orderly and mostly predictable manner ... [and] has been large-
ly successful in maintaining continuity in the government."' 16 This sentiment
was reaffirmed by Cuba's vice-president, Carlos Lage, who stated, "'conti-
nuity' is the word," when asked about the current political situation in Cuba
in early 2007.17 And continuity should come easy when it is considered that
Rafil Castro has played "a major role in the [daily] operations of [Cuba]"
since Fidel Castro came to power and all the key players of the Fidel Castro
government remain in place, namely Ricardo Alarc6n, head of the National
Assembly, Felipe Per6z Roque, acting foreign minister, and Carlos Lage,
vice-president and top economic advisor.' 8
Nevertheless, while the Castro government attempts incessantly to por-
tray a united and strong government, dissention grows in the upper echelons
of the Castro government as Fidel Castro withdraws from the political
scene--dissention "created and fueled by Fidel himself ... to prevent alli-
ances [that could] threaten his rule."' 9 In keeping with his desire to prevent
uprising within his own government, Fidel Castro failed to create any institu-
tions or policies which could be implemented at such time when he decided
to transfer power.2 Instead, Fidel Castro "resort[ed] ... to charging a group
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 15.
15. Id. at 25.
16. CREIGHTON REPORT, supra note 11, at 25.
17. Mark Frank, Cuba Looks Past Raul for Future Leadership, CANF, Jan. 23, 2007,
http://canfl.org/artman/publish/cuba-news/CubalookspastRaul for-future-leadership.sht
ml.
18. CREIGHTON REPORT, supra note 11, at 25-26.
19. Cuban Am. Nat'l Found., Summary: CANF Policy Recommendations in a Post-Fidel
Castro Era (Jan. 23, 2007),
http://canfl.org/artman/publish/analysis on-cuba/SummaryCANFPolicyRecommendation
s_in a_post-FidelCastroera.shtml [hereinafter CANF Policy Recommendations].
20. Cuban Am. Nat'l Found., CANF White Paper: Cuba in Transition 2006 (Jan. 23,
2007),
http://canfl.org/artman/publish/analysis on cuba/CANFWhite-PaperCuba-inTransition_
2006.shtml.
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of his trusted followers with the responsibility of overseeing the continuation
of his disastrous legacy," an action which has resulted in the erosion of trust
amongst Castro's "inner circle."'" While it appears in the short term that a
successful succession has occurred, a transition to democracy in Cuba is still
probable in light of several factors including, but not limited to, a possible
civil uprising at the end of a charismatic regime, a worsening economy, dis-
sention amongst the ruling members of Cuba, and an opportunistic elite
class. 2 "While the masses may play a role in provoking or exacerbating a
crisis of legitimacy on the island, they are not as likely to play as important a
role as members of the elite in dismantling ... the current regime-primarily
because of the general weakness of civil society in Cuba."2 3 This elite class
transition will likely arise when the ruling class becomes frustrated with the
political, social, or economic status quo and seeks to impose reforms on the
post-Castro government.24 Because little is known about the preferences of
the elite and ruling class in Cuba, there is no way to tell what exactly will
trigger these groups to transition to a democracy, but such a transition will
likely arise when the members of these groups see a free market democracy
as a valid and advantageous alternative to their current situation.25 The fu-
ture of Cuba is unclear, but what is clear, even to Cuban officials, is that "no
single person can replace the 80-year-old Maximum Leader, who microman-
aged projects, gave marathon speeches, and entertained [elite] visitors at
dinners lasting until dawn" and, as such, some kind of change in the Cuba
regime can be seen on the horizon.26 Whether Cuba moves quickly towards
democracy or evolves into a hybrid state of communism and capitalism like
China, a post-Castro Cuban government will unquestionably have to deal
with confiscated property claims in an equitable and legal manner, so as to
encourage investment and enterprise in Cuba, and legitimize itself on the
world stage.
Part II of this article provides a brief history of confiscations in Cuba, a
necessary backdrop to understanding the applicability and appropriateness of
restitution and compensation for Cuban takings. Part III similarly provides a
brief survey of relevant Cuban, United States, and international property law,
which should also be considered in the formulation of a restitution policy.
21. Id.
22. See CREIGHTON REPORT, supra note 11, at 26-28.
23. Id. at 28.
24. See id. at 28-29.
25. Id.
26. Anita Snow, Cuban Am. Nat'l Found., Cuba's Post-Castro Transition Occurs without
Major Changes (Jan. 22, 2007), http://canfl.org/artman/publish/cubamin-transition/
Cuba s_post-Castro transition occurs_ without major changes.shtml.
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Part IV of this article proposes the Step-Down Restitution Policy as an an-
swer to claims for confiscated Cuban property. Part IV also defines the vari-
ous facets of the policy and explores how such a policy would operate. Part
IV concludes by justifying implementation of such a policy based on Cuban
and international law and the experiences of the Baltic States and Europe,
which have similarly implemented restitution and compensation policies in
their endeavors to return to a democratic and free market society. Part V
briefly presents the lessons Cuba could learn from Iran and Ethiopia, which
established special courts to handle property claims and remedy the taking of
seized property. Part VI concludes that the Step-Down Restitution Policy is
an equitable resolution to violations of Cuban and international law by the
Castro regime, allowing a post-Castro Cuban government the flexibility to
manage and resolve what will be a multitude of claims against it by hundreds
of thousands of Cuban Nationals and Cuban Americans and providing a fu-
ture Cuba the opportunity to attract a return of capital to the country by Cu-
ban-American Citizens, the United States, and foreign investors, alike. If
Cuba wishes to cure its economic woes, and develop a free market, it will
need to reach a settlement with the world, one which includes an equitable
restitution scheme.27
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONFISCATIONS IN CUBA
A. Pre-Castro Regime
Cuban property rights began with the first recognition of the right of an
individual to own private property, found in Article 32 of the Constitution of
1901, Cuba's first since its independence from Spain.28 Article 32 required a
property owner who was dispossessed of his or her property by the Cuban
government to be provided compensation for such a taking, or restitution of
the property where compensation was not given.29 After a period of political
instability, Cuba enacted "[t]he Constitution of 1940 [which] guaranteed all
27. Ortiz, supra note 6, at 322-23.
28. Id. at 324.
29. Travieso-Diaz, Alternate Remedies, supra note 3, at 666. Article 32 specifically
provides "[n]o one shall be deprived of his property except by competent authority, upon
proof that the condemnation is required by public utility, and previous indemnification. If the
indemnification is not previously paid, the courts shall protect the owners and, if needed,
restore to them the property." CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA art. 32 (1901), re-
printed in 2 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPILATION OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE INDEPENDENT NATIONS OF THE NEW WORLD 112, 119 (Josd Ignacio Rodriguez trans.,
1905).
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Cuban citizens extensive social and economic rights, including substantial
property ights,... [through] Articles 24 and 87." 3o Article 24 stated:
[c]onfiscation of property is prohibited. No one can be deprived of
his property [except] by competent judicial authority and for a jus-
tified cause of public utility or social [interest], and always after
payment of the corresponding indemnity in cash, judicially fixed.
Non-compliance with these requisites shall determine the right of
the person whose property has been expropriated, to be protected
by the courts, and, if the case falls for it, to have his property re-
stored to him. The reality of the cause of public utility or social in-
terest, and the need for the expropriation, shall be decided by the
courts in case of impugnation.
31
In 1952, after a military coup d'6tat, Fulgencio Batista repealed the
Constitution of 1940 and failed to reinstate the property protections found in
said constitution.32 When Fidel Castro rose to power, he used Batista's ac-
tions as a basis for his first attack on property rights, and made amendments
to Article 24 of the Constitution of 1940 via the Fundamental Law of 1959. 3"
These amendments were procedurally illegal under the amendment proce-
dure of the Constitution of 1940, 34 which is significant considering that in
1959 "Judge Manuel Urritia, the person Castro chose to be Cuba's President,
announced that the 1940 Constitution ... would continue to be the law of the
land."35 Cuban exiles consider the Constitution of 1940, "'the last legitimate
expression of the constitutional will of the Cuban people' and therefore still
in effect today."36
B. Post-Castro Regime
Beginning "[i]n 1959, [Fidel] Castro led a communist revolution that
systematically and progressively destroyed the fundamental human rights of
the people on the island," despite his initial reenactment of Article 24 pursu-
30. Ortiz, supra note 6, at 326.
31. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies, supra note 3, at 666 (citing CONSTITUCION DE
LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (1940) art. 24 (Cuba), translated in 1 CoNsTITUTIONS OF NATIONs 610,
614 (Amos J. Peaslee ed., 2d ed. 1956)).
32. Ortiz, supra note 6, at 327.
33. Id. at 328.
34. Id.
35. Kathleen S. Adams, Comment, Subchapter III of the Helms Burton Act: A Reason-
able Assertion of United States Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 21 HAMLINE L. REv. 147, 151
(1997).
36. Grider, supra note 5, at 481.
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ant to the Fundamental Law of 1959. 3' After Castro "confiscate[d] property
and bank accounts [belonging to] General Batista ... and his supporters," he
initiated a nationalization agenda with the goals of "land reform, economic[]
punish[ment] [against] the United States for cutting ... sugar import[s]," and
transformation of Cuba into a socialist state. 3' To effectuate these goals,
Castro enacted the Agrarian Reform Act, which seized all agricultural estates
over 165 acres.39 In July of 1960, Castro seized all United States corporate
property and virtually all Cuban businesses pursuant to Laws No. 851 and
890, respectively.4' While both laws mandated compensation for such tak-
ings, no such compensation was ever provided by the Castro government.4'
In October of 1960, the Castro government enacted the Urban Reform law,
which eliminated the private sale and rental of homes, transferred property to
homeless Cuban citizens, canceled mortgages, and made all rent and mort-
gage payments payable to the state.42 In effect, the Urban Reform Law made
the Cuban government the primary landlord of all residential property, reduc-
ing homeowners to tenants on their own land.43 Although the Urban Reform
Law granted "title" to some Cubans Citizens in the transfer of property, this
title was much more limited than the "classical notions of title" as it "was not
freely alienable," transfers required state approval, and the Cuban govern-
ment maintained "the right of first refusal" on all transfers of property." The
onslaught on property rights continued in 1961 with the passage of Law 989,
which made "it illegal for Cubans to leave Cuba and penalized those who
fled after the revolution by authorizing state agencies to seize their prop-
erty. 4 5 The early years of Castro's regime were marked with massive de-
partures of Cuban Citizens and the taking and redistribution of their real
property.46
In 1976, Castro hammered the last nail in the proverbial coffin of Cuban
property rights when he enacted the Constitution of 1976, which confiscated
37. Ortiz, supra note 6, at 322.
38. Bradley T. Gilmore, U.S.-Cuba Compensation Policy, 8 TEX. Hisp. J.L. & POL'Y 79,
82(2002).
39. See Ortiz, supra note 6, at 329.
40. Id. at 332.
41. Id.
42. Pefialver, supra note 1, at 126. "The [Urban Reform] Act rendered all existing leases
[and mortgages] of urban property null and void" and fixed the price of home sales. Nicoli J.
Gutidrrez, Jr., The De-Constitutionalization of Property Rights: Castro's Systematic Assault
on Private Ownership in Cuba, 5 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L. 51, 60 (1996).
43. Pefialver, supra note 1, at 126.
44. Grider, supra note 5, at 476.
45. Kern Alexander & Jon Mills, Resolving Property Claims in a Post-Socialist Cuba, 27
LAW& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 137, 165 (1995).
46. Peflalver, supra note 1, at 127.
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or expropriated almost all property on the island.47 Amendments to the Con-
stitution of 1976 in 1992 expanded property rights for the first time since
Castro's takeover by allowing foreign countries to purchase partial interests
in commercial property tied to certain industries, such as tourism.48 These
amendments also had the effect of further complicating property rights in
Cuba by allowing foreign countries to obtain interests in property belonging
to United States citizens and United States corporations.49 Offensive acts
such as these and Castro's expropriations in general in the years following
his rise to power, serve as the single greatest impediment in a future transi-
tion of post-Castro Cuban government to a free market society.5"
III. LAW AND POLICY WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED
When the tumultuous history of Cuban property rights is considered in
conjunction with the disarray of the Cuban economy and legal infrastructure,
it is evident that redressing confiscated property claims will be a monumental
task. Since 1959, Cuba has seized property in three manners:
(1) expropriation of Cuban and foreign-owned land... ; (2) con-
fiscation of property from alleged "collaborators" of the Batista
regime [and] "counterrevolutionaries" . . . ; and (3) seizure of real
and personal property "voluntarily" "abandoned" by Cuban citi-
zens who travelled [sic] abroad and failed to return within a speci-
fied time period.'
Given the disparate nature of the takings and the future claimants, no
one set of governing principles will dictate the resolution of claims. Thus, a
restitution and compensation policy may very well require the use of Cuban,
American, and international law in the resolution of expropriated land
claims.
A. Cuban Property Law: Then and Now
Legal protection of property rights at the time of Castro's initial takings
was found in Article 24 of the Constitution of 1940,52 which to this day "still
47. Ortiz, supra note 6, at 332-33.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 333-34.
50. See Frances H. Foster, Restitution of Expropriated Property: Post-Soviet Lessons for
Cuba, 34 COLUM. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 621,623 (1996).
51. Id. at 651.
52. Garibaldi & Kirby, supra note 4, at 233.
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commands respect and enjoys legitimacy among the heirs to the democratic
Cuban tradition., 53 "Under Article 24, a governmental taking" is illegal if a
court failed to certify the public purpose the government asserts as grounds
for the taking, or if the government fails to provide compensation in cash. 14
Certain takings, such as those made pursuant to Law No. 989, would then be
violative of this standard and unconstitutional as no public purpose was ever
legitimized by the court and compensation was never paid to those Cuban
citizens who fled the country during the early years of the Castro regime and
refused to return.55 The illegality of seizures made pursuant to Law No. 989
is underscored when it is considered that confiscated property was not volun-
tarily abandoned, but instead left behind by Cuban citizens who fled the
country for fear of political persecution.56 Where acts of the Cuban govern-
ment can be proven unconstitutional under the Constitution of 1940, which
as referenced above was reinstituted by the Castro regime, Cuban domestic
law will be sufficient to validate a restitution program.57 However, "whether
the Fundamental Law of 1959 is valid or the original 1940 Constitution is
still the law of the land, compensation was [nevertheless] required but [nev-
er] paid."58
B. Relevant United States Law
Confiscated property claims by United States citizens and corporations
were initially based on the 19th century "international law principle[]
[which] require[s] 'prompt, adequate and effective' compensation to aliens
whose property is confiscated. 5 9 However, the applicability of this principle
as an international standard and the requirements of compensation for expro-
priations were called into question by the United States Supreme Court in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,6° where it provided evidence of So-
viet countries who refused to provide just compensation, if at all, for their
takings.6 Since the early 1960s, United States law has developed several
53. Id.at25I.
54. Alexander & Mills, supra note 45, at 146. See also 2 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 29, at 117.
55. See Grider, supra note 5, at 483.
56. See id. at 483-84.
57. Id. at 482.
58. Alexander & Mills, supra note 45, at 148.
59. Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 7, at 222.
60. 376 U.S. 398 (1963).
61. Pefialver, supra note 1, at 141 n.220. See also Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at
428-30.
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legal justifications upon which a compensation program could be based, such
as "the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Cuban Claims Program under the
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, the Cuban Democracy Act of
1992, and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996. "62 The
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, also known as the
Helms-Burton Act, was developed "to discourage foreign investment in Cu-
ba and to hasten the demise of Fidel Castro's communist regime."63 Title III
of the Helms-Burton Act provides:
any person that... traffics in property which was confiscated by
the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959, shall be liable
to any United States national who owns the claim to such property
for money damages in an amount equal to the sum of... the fair
market value of that property, calculated as being either the current
value of the property, or the value of the property when confis-
cated plus interest, whichever is greater; and ... court costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees. 64
The Helms-Burton Act allows Americans and American corporations
who have had property confiscated to sue any person who has derived some
sort of economic benefit from the use or purchase of expropriated property.65
This "private cause of action" stands as an avenue of compensation for in-
jured parties and also serves to deter "foreign investment in Cuba., 66 Over-
all, the Helms-Burton Act represents the United States "unwavering stance
against Cuba's illegal seizure of [United States] property, a clear violation of
Communist countries, although they have in fact provided a degree of compensation after dip-
lomatic efforts, commonly recognize no obligation on the part of the taking country. Certain
representatives of the newly independent and underdeveloped countries have questioned
whether rules of state responsibility toward aliens can bind nations that have not consented to
them and it is argued that the traditionally articulated standards governing expropriation of
property reflect "imperialist" interests and are inappropriate to the circumstances of emergent
states.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 429-30.
62. Gilmore, supra note 38, at 84-85. "The Cuban Claims Program... active between
1966 and 1972," certified 5911 claims made by United States corporations and citizens in the
amount of $1.8 billion. See also Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 7, at
220.
63. David M. Shamberger, The Helms-Burton Act: A Legal and Effective Vehicle for
Redressing US. Property Claims in Cuba and Accelerating the Demise of the Castro Regime,
21 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 497,497 (1998).
64. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, § 302, Pub. L.
No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785, 815.
65. Grider, supra note 5, at 485.
66. Shamberger, supra note 63, at 517.
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international law, and punishes those individuals and corporations who are..
. reaping benefits from this stolen property.
67
C. Don't Forget International Law
Intemational law is as vast as it is undefined, but grounds for a compen-
sation scheme can be found throughout its principles. "Under the human
rights model . . . [of] international law," the unjustified expropriation of
property without proper compensation constitutes a violation of the property
owner's individual rights, standing in staunch contrast to classical interna-
tional law which placed the state sovereignty above the property owner and
individual rights.6" In keeping with this notion, in 1948, the United Nations
passed a resolution, entitled the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which "stated, in Article 17, that everyone has the right to own property and
to not be arbitrarily deprived of that property., 69 "In 1974, the United Na-
tions adopted Resolution 3281 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Du-
ties," which required appropriate compensation to be paid by the state that is
undertaking the expropriation of property.7" The importance of compensa-
tion after the expropriation of properties was supported by the adoption of
chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which
provides for a tribunal to determine compensation where "a state actor has
[either blatantly] expropriated foreign investment property" or adopted regu-
lation that has the effect of expropriation of such property.7 Although the
definition of compensation in chapter 11 "does not mention the word 'ade-
quate,' that term has long been understood to mean fair market value, which
NAFTA unequivocally requires. 7 2
67. Id. at 500-01.
68. See Pefialver, supra note 1, at 134-35.
69. Id. at 154.
70. Ortiz, supra note 6, at 339.
Article 2.2(c) of [U.N.] Resolution 3281 provides each state has the right [to] nationalize, ex-
propriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation
should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and
regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the
question of compensation gives rise to ... controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic
law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all
States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of sovereign equality of
States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means.
Id.
71. Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J
110, 110 (2002).
72. Id. at 113.
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IV. STEP-DOWN RESTITUTION EXPLORED
Despite the availability of Cuban, United States, and international prop-
erty law as a legal foundation for confiscated property claims, one group of
claimants, Cuban exiles, finds itself in the doldrums of legal protection when
it comes to redress for seized property.7 3 Cuban exiles do not have standing
under United States or international law to invoke the protection of foreign
countries against Cuba because the property takings occurred when the exiles
were nationals of Cuba.74 "Moreover, the Castro regime enacted laws pro-
hibiting Cuban exiles who fled Cuba after the revolution from asserting prop-
erty claims in Cuban courts."" The lack of redress for Cuban exiles is as-
tounding when it is considered that the aggregate amount of confiscated
property claims by Cuban nationals is thought to exceed $7 billion, more
than three times that of United States claimants. 76  Given the inequities in
current property law, and Cuba's need to transition into a free market soci-
ety, a future post-Castro Cuban government will have to enter into a treaty
with the United States that provides a new legal framework through which to
address confiscated property claims.77 This "new legal framework must"
proclaim all takings by the Castro government as illegal and invalid and im-
plement an equitable restitution policy for all victims of Castro's regime,
preferably through a future dedicated court. 78 A post-Castro Cuban govern-
ment should institute the Step-Down Restitution Policy.79 While the pre-
sumptive remedy in this policy is the return of confiscated property, a Cuban
court or tribunal will have the flexibility on a case-by-case basis to award
other remedies such as the substitution of property and monetary compensa-
tion.81 Such a policy will allow the Cuban government, with its limited fi-
nancial resources and struggling economy, to begin to provide redress for its
73. See Alexander & Mills, supra note 45, at 156-60.
74. Id. at 156-57. See also CREIGHTON REPORT, supra note 11, at 109.
Many Cuban nationals whose property was taken by the Castro regime fled Cuba and
settled in the United States, where they eventually acquired the status of permanent res-
idents or citizens of the United States. While their claims arose in Cuba, they seek the
protection of the U.S. government. Such protection could not be granted because expa-
triates were not U.S. citizens when their claims arose.
Alexander & Mills, supra note 45, at 158.
75. Alexander & Mills, supra note 45, at 158.
76. Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 7, at 221.
77. Ortiz, supra note 6, at 334, 336.
78. Id. at 336, 341.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 342.
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confiscations in a timely fashion in an attempt to jump start its future as a
free market society.8"
At the inception of Cuba's march towards a free market society, Cuba
will encounter its greatest obstacle, "the absence of an existing" commercial
and real estate market from which to accurately gauge the value of seized
properties and industries.12 Nevertheless, an appropriate remediation policy
in Cuba must ensure restitution or equitable compensation to former property
owners and must not be too strict in execution as to harm the economy by
deterring foreign investment or destabilizing blossoming economic mar-
kets.83 A restitution system must also attempt to meet the following, albeit at
times inconsistent, objectives:
1) providing predictable and substantially fair treatment to all in-
terested parties; 2) creating, in the shortest possible time, a regime
of clear, secure and marketable rights to property; 3) promoting the
expeditious privatization of state-held assets; 4) encouraging the
early onset of substantial foreign investment; and 5) keeping the
aggregate cost of the remedies within the financial means of the
country. 
84
To meet these goals, a policy implementing Step-Down Restitution will
require the establishment of commissions, tribunals, or courts with the legal
authority to settle claims on an individual basis by virtue of a well defined
body of procedures, eligibility guidelines, and evidentiary standards. 85 A
post-Castro Cuban government through these tribunals or courts "will have
to balance the rights and interests of the former owners against" the rights of
third party foreign investors and the rights of any lessees or occupants on the
property at the time of settlement of the claim.86 This is especially true due
to the presumptive remedy of restitution of the confiscated property offered
by the Step-Down Restitution Policy. 87 Moreover, the post-Castro Cuban
government will have to determine and establish clear guidelines regarding if
and/or how different types and sizes of property will be treated under the law
as the former Czechoslovakian government did when it enacted legislation
81. Id. at 336.
82. Grider, supra note 5, at 457.
83. Alexander & Mills, supra note 45, at 168.
84. Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 7, at 244-45.
85. Ortiz, supra note 6, at 341.
86. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies, supra note 3, at 678.
87. See Ortiz, supra note 6, at 342; Travieso-Diaz, Alternate Remedies, supra note 3, at
676-77; Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 7, at 245.
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distinguishing between small, large, and agricultural properties. 8' Lastly,
regardless of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of confiscations by the Cas-
tro government, the post-Castro Cuban government must take up the duty to
adequately and equitably provide redress to Cuban exiles, Cuban nationals,
and all foreigners, alike.89
A. Sum of Its Parts
The first step in the Step-Down Restitution Policy is direct restitution. 90
As noted above, the term restitution has been used interchangeably to refer to
all forms of remediation for confiscated property claims. 91 However, under
this restitution policy, the term restitution is used to mean the return of the
expropriated property "to the original owner or [the original owner's]
heirs. 92 Direct or natural restitution is often used to specifically connote the
"return of the actual property expropriated during the communist era."93
Where return of the actual confiscated property is impossible or impractica-
ble, substitution restitution, as the second step in the policy, provides for the
replacement of property equivalent to that which was illegally seized.94
However, courts should also have the option of returning confiscated prop-
erty to the original owner even though such property is currently being used
in a manner that would be incongruent with the former owner's regular use,
such as in the case where the property is being used for a governmental or
utility purpose, where a change in the use of the property would be detrimen-
tal to the public welfare, or where the property is serving as the primary resi-
dence of an individual or individuals. Direct restitution in such a case would
not serve as a tool which the claimant could use to remove individuals, busi-
nesses, or government buildings from the property, but instead would be the
avenue through which the claimant could seek and recover current and past
rent for the use of the property.95
The third step in the Step-Down Restitution Policy is compensation,
which refers to financial remediation in exchange for the expropriated prop-
erty.96 One form of compensation, as used by Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia
88. Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 7, at 246-47.
89. Id. at 247.
90. See Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 7, at 245.
91. See Ortiz, supra note 6, at 342.
92. Gilmore, supra note 38, at 93.
93. Foster, supra note 50, at 633-34.
94. Id. at 635.
95. See Ortiz, supra note 6, at 342-43. See also, Travieso-Diaz, Alternate Remedies,
supra note 3, at 677.
96. Foster, supra note 50, at 636.
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(hereinafter the Baltic States), "consists generally of [a] lump-sum payment[]
approximating the actual value of property at the time of nationalization."97
Under a voucher system of compensation, "former owners receive vouchers,
certificates, bonds, or shares redeemable for property 'similar in value' to
their confiscated assets, for shares in a compensation fund, or for stock or
'investment checks' in newly privatized enterprises, housing or land par-
cels."98 Some Eastern European countries have decided to offer vouchers as
compensation, but have limited their versatility by not allowing such vouch-
ers to be redeemable for money, but nevertheless available as collateral for
loans, as payment for property sold by the government, and in exchange for
annuity investments.99 Hungarian law, for example, defines the vouchers as
"interest bearing transferable securities that can be traded on the Budapest
Stock Exchange, but can not be exchanged for cash."' 0 The last step of the
Step-Down Restitution Policy constitutes a miscellaneous category com-
prised of alternative remedies considered equitable remediation for expro-
priation claims that can not be resolved in the previous steps. 101 A list of
potential alternate remedies includes:
(1) credits on taxes and duties to the extent of all or part of the
claim amount; (2) the ability to exchange the claim for other in-
vestment opportunities, such as management contracts, beneficial
interests in state-owned enterprises, and preferences in government
contracting; and (3) other benefits [available through individual
negotiations]. 102
B. Step-Down in Detail
Restitution and compensation each have their own advantages and dis-
advantages.103 While direct restitution is the preferred remedy in the Step-
Down Restitution Policy, equitable resolution to varying property claims will
require the use of all forms of redress in a pragmatic and flexible manner.'"
In general, restitution strategies have the advantages of 1) making
a decisive break with a previous regime; 2) clearly establishing the
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Travieso-Diaz, Alternate Remedies, supra note 3, at 681.
100. Alexander & Mills, supra note 45, at 176.
101. See Travieso-Diaz, Alternate Remedies, supra note 3, at 682.
102. Id.
103. See Ortiz, supra note 6, at 342-43.
104. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies, supra note 3, at 678.
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priority and validity of property rights; 3) costing the state treasury
less than paying compensation to previous owners would cost; 4)
providing a clear title for owners of restituted property, which may
ease issues of property governance and encourage new investment;
and 5) stimulating markets in property and thereby leading to
higher economic efficiency uses....
[Conversely], [c]ompensation programs [may] help avoid
many [of these] problems, [b]ut they are likely to be very costly,
fail to make a decisive break from prior regimes and their policies
and practices, open the question who will eventually gain control
of these properties ... and generally are paid at only a small per-
centage of any value that might be placed on the property. 1
05
Thus, a flexible policy which allows for the usage of both remedies-
albeit favoring restitution-provides the post-Castro government with the
opportunity to maximize the advantages of both remedies while limiting the
disadvantages.' 06 The remedies provided in the Step-Down Restitution Pol-
icy and the manner in which they are offered have been recognized and util-
ized by the Baltic States.107 However, in the execution of such policies, the
Baltic States have learned practical lessons that can serve as guidelines and
regulatory gap fillers in a remediation policy used by a future, post-Castro
Cuban government. '08 While the successes and failures of the Baltic States
and European countries in their attempts toward a free market society will
later justify the implementation of the Step-Down Restitution Policy, they
will also serve to strengthen its application in a democratic Cuba. '09
Although direct restitution is the presumptive remedy in the Step-Down
Restitution Policy, situations will arise where direct restitution will be appro-
priate only with the enforcement of certain conditions."' In Lithuania, a
former owner may have confiscated property returned but may not reoccupy
such property if the property currently houses tenants who lived on the prop-
erty during the communist regime."1  While title of property under such cir-
cumstances will return to the previous owner, the owner will be limited in his
ability to reoccupy the land until the current tenants find an alternative place
105. CREIGHTON REPORT, supra note 11, at 88-89.
106. See id.
107. Ortiz, supra note 6, at 344-47.
108. Id. at 353.
109. See id.
110. See, e.g., id., at 345-50; Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies, supra note 3, at 677-
81; Alexander & Mills, supra note 45, at 172.
111. Ortiz, supra note 6, at 346.
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to live. 1 2  However, Lithuania does allow restituted property owners to
charge rent in these situations.' Given the nationalization and redistribu-
tion of residential property and the socialist goal of expanding "home-
ownership" to a greater number of Cuban citizens," 4 Cuba will likely face
the same problem as Lithuania and should adopt such a policy so as to avoid
conflict between U.S. Citizens and returning Cuban exiles and Cuban Na-
tionals. In Germany, "[w]hen property is returned, the former owner may
have to pay for any improvements to the property that increased its value
[but] ... if the value of the property decreased as a result of the confiscation,
the former owner is compensated for the decrease."' 15 Restitution programs
operate on the underlying principle that a former property owner, foreign or
domestic, has the right to the return of the confiscated property where the
confiscation by the state was illegal or ineffective "'-a policy which should
be at the heart of any Cuban remediation program.
"The possibility of returning the actual property seized by the govern-
ment, however, [may] depend[] on ... economic and social considerations"
and whether the original property may be clearly identified in the face of
changes to that property. "' Similar to the proposed Step-Down Restitution
Policy, "Baltic schemes attempt to" indemnify owners of confiscated prop-
erty by providing substituted property where it has become impossible or
impracticable to provide direct restitution."' Direct restitution may be im-
possible because the property has "been devoted to a use not easily reversed
or providing substantial public utility."' However, as referenced above,
courts in such a situation may have and should implement the option of re-
turning the confiscated property to the original owner on the condition that
the original owner will not expel current tenants or seek the removal of
buildings on the returned property, but with the understanding that future,
and perhaps past, rent may be collected.
Return of confiscated property "has been the preferred" and presump-
tive remedy in Germany, Czech Republic and Slovakia, the Baltic States,
Bulgaria and Romania. 20 However, countries like the Czech Republic and
Slovakia have passed legislation which provides claimants and their succes-
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Pefialver, supra note 1, at 126.
115. Ortiz, supra note 6, at 347.
116. Alexander & Mills, supra note 45, at 172.
117. Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 7, at 251.
118. Ortiz, supra note 6, at 345.
119. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies, supra note 3, at 677.
120. Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 7, at 252.
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sors with compensation in situations where the expropriated "property has
been destroyed, irrevocably altered, or improved through use" and a substi-
tute can not be found.' 2 1 In these situations, "international arbitration tribu-
nals have held that the state must pay compensation in an amount that would
make the former owner[s] whole again."' 22 These are but a few samples of
the determinations Cuba will have to make once it implements the Step-
Down Restitution Policy as such decisions will allow Cuba to adequately
manage claims with unique issues under a broader restitution policy. While
lessons from the Baltic States and Eastern Europe serve as guiding principles
in the execution of a remediation program, they also serve to justify the im-
plementation of not only a remediation, but specifically the policy proposed
in this article. Ultimately, Cuba and a special dedicated court should imple-
ment the proposed policy with the understanding the policy operates on the
underlying principle that property illegally and unjustly seized should be
returned to the true owner.
C. Justification from Around the World
In the Twentieth Century, the world witnessed a series of intrusions into
private property rights on account of rising political and military conflicts,
which resulted in the confiscation of property from millions of people.'
Countries ravaged by attacks on private property rights have used differing
systems of settling property disputes and their experiences prove invaluable
to understanding the problems Cuba will face in its transition to a free-
market democracy with re-instituted property rights. 124 As such, justification
for the implementation of the Step-Down Restitution Policy can be seen
from, not only the interpretation of Cuban law, but also the remedial actions
and results of the international community. 12' Restitution should be identi-
fied as the preferred form of redress in Cuba "because it encourages property
owners to repatriate with their entrepreneurial talent and capital . . . [and]
minimizes costs for the government [by reducing the payment] of funds to
previous owners."'26 Moreover, restitution has been said to accomplish three
major goals:
121. Ortiz, supra note 6, at 349-50.
122. Alexander & Mills, supra note 45, at 172.
123. CREIGHTON REPORT, supra note 11, at 37.
124. See id.
125. See, e.g., Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies, supra note 3, at 680-83; Travieso-
Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 7, at 241-56; Foster, supra note 50, at 625-49;
Merrill, supra note 71, at 114-16; Anna Gelpern, The Laws and Politics of Reprivatization in
East-Central Europe: A Comparison, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 315, 337-51 (1993).
126. Gilmore, supra note 38, at 93.
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[flirst, restitution promotes rapid, efficient transition to a market
economy by transferring state and collective property to private
owners and, at the same time, "restoring the value of property" in
the minds of citizens; [s]econd, it is "morally the right thing to do"
to remedy past "injustices"; [and] [t]hird, restitution reinforces
governmental claims to continuity with pre-[Communist] regimes
and thus, serves "as a vehicle for the construction of a post-
Communist national identity."'
27
Restitution programs in place in Central and Eastern Europe and the
Baltic States, as well as Cuban and international law in place at the time of
the takings, provide clear justification for a restitution policy in a post-Castro
Cuba."2 8 In addition, tribunals established in Iran and Ethiopia shed light on
the issues that a future Cuban property court will face. 29
1. Lessons from the Baltic States and Europe
"[T]he former [c]ommunist countries [in] Central and Eastern Europe
provide a context in which to assess the parameters of any future [restitution]
program" and, through their experiences, many of the justifications for the
adoption of such a flexible restitution policy. 3 0 As stated above, the Baltic
States have favored direct restitution of property, business, and residential
buildings 3' and have adhered to the principle "that their citizens are entitled
to resume their lives as they were prior to the communist takeover."' 32 The
use of restitution as the main remedy was also utilized because most of the
countries ravaged by attacks on property ights were extremely cash poor."'
However, the Baltic States like the Czech Republic have allowed "for com-
pensation in cash and securities where restitution [has been] impossible."' 134
Unlike other countries in the region, Hungary has favored a compensation
policy that provided confiscated property owners with "interest-bearing cer-
tificates, which [could] be used to purchase state-owned property" and shares
in business placed on sale by the state. ' While the incorporation of mone-
tary and voucher compensation "recognizes the limits of Cuba's ability to
127. Foster, supra note 50, at 626.
128. Id. at 625.
129. See CREIGHTON REPORT, supra note 11, at 38-58.
130. Alexander & Mills, supra note 45, at 145.
131. Foster, supra note 50, at 634.
132. Ortiz, supra note 6, at 344.
133. CREIGHTON REPORT, supra note 11, at 73.
134. Gelpem, supra note 125, at 337.
135. Ortiz, supra note 6, at 349.
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pay compensation claims and avoids the dislocation costs and disputes asso-
ciated with direct restitution,"' 36 over-reliance on this form of remediation
could create disastrous results and create enormous difficulties for Cuba in
the infancy of its development into a free market society.
Compensation when used in isolation as the sole remedy for confiscated
property claims causes the privatizing governments to incur huge "debts, as
seen in Hungary and Poland, which forces governments to choose between
servicing the debt and funding needed social programs." 137 This is evident as
Hungary changed its voucher compensation program over the years by limit-
ing the amount of capital private companies could draw from state-paid
vouchers and the amount of revenue agricultural property owners could col-
lect from the state.138 Moreover, Hungary's voucher program provides in-
adequate compensation for the takings as "the vouchers [have] trad[ed] at
less than 50% of their face value."' 3 9 Most attempts at remediation by virtue
of financial compensation have resulted in insignificant redress for illegal
takings. 4 In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, claims redressed only by
financial compensation were limited to approximately $1000 per claimant
and were limited as to the amount of land for which one individual claimant
could recover.'4 ' Financial compensation has even caused problems in those
Baltic States where multiple remedies were provided.'4
Due to budgetary constraints, Baltic States have been effectively
restricted in their capacity to offer extensive financial compensa-
tion. All three countries have limited hard currency reserves...
Estonia has attempted to address this situation by creating a special
"compensation fund," consisting of fifty percent of all amounts re-
ceived from privatization sales. 1
43
"Voucher privatization has also encountered problems ... [a]ccording
to recent reports ... for many Estonians, such certificates have turned out to
be little more than a 'packet of waste paper.' The Estonian government al-
legedly issued an estimated eight to nine times more securities than it had
property to sell."'"
136. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies, supra note 3, at 681.
137. Gihnore, supra note 38, at 92.
138. Gelpen, supra note 125, at 345-46.
139. Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 7, at 256.
140. See Gelpem, supra note 125, at 355.
141. See id.
142. Foster, supra note 50, at 643.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 644.
2008]
21
Espino: Step-Down Restitution: A Proposal for an Equitable Resolution to
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
NOVA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 32
Restitution policies have provided beneficial results in countries such as
the Czech Republic and Slovakia where it has been said to "'enhanc[e] the
credibility of economic reform by increasing its irreversibility,' providing a
way to resolve claims without impacting the country's depleted treasury, and
lending political legitimacy to the government and the democratization proc-
ess."'45 A transitional Cuban government will not likely "have access to
adequate" capital and other financial resources to compensate all claimants
for confiscated property and, as such, "restitution may be the preferred op-
tion," especially if Cuba is unable to get international financing.' 46  One
commentator has argued that restitution has actually harmed the economies
of the Baltic States because delays in the resolution of property claims re-
sulted in delays of mass privatizations and unclear titles, thereby deterring
foreign investment.147  However, most of the justifications for a restitution
policy found in Cuban law and the Cuban experience, explained below, di-
rectly controvert those very allegations. 148
145. Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 7, at 253 (quoting Claus Offe et
al., A Forum on Restitution, 2 E. EUROPEAN CONST. REv. 30, 31 (1993)).
146. CREIGHTON REPORT, supra note 11, at 78.
147. Foster, supra note 50, at 646-47. See also Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution,
supra note 7, at 253 n.128.
The Baltic experience reveals, however, that there could be ... serious drawbacks to Cu-
ban adoption of a restitution program. Identification, certification, review, and resolution of
restitution applications could create a significant burden on inexperienced, inadequately staffed
governmental and judicial organs. Cuba, like the Baltic [S]tates, has only limited personnel
with the legal and real estate expertise to handle complex property issues.
Furthermore, the preceding study suggests that restitution could act as a major brake on
overall Cuban national economic modernization. It could delay the establishment of stable,
marketable legal title to assets, a critical requirement for both privatization and domestic and
foreign investment. Moreover, it could further drain an already depleted Cuban national treas-
ury. A Baltic-style restitution program would obligate the Cuban state either to turn over state
and collective property gratuitously or to pay equivalent compensation. In the Cuban case this
would be particularly onerous because of the sheer enormity of U.S. claims for "prompt, ade-
quate and effective" compensation for expropriated property.
Finally, the examples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania indicate that restitution could
have a severe socioeconomic impact on current Cuban citizens. As in these three states, the
Cuban government has heavily subsidized the living expenses of its population. It has pre-
vented its citizens from significant acquisition of assets and, until recently, legally prohibited
them from accumulating hard currency. Thus, if Cuba should elect to return property to for-
mer owners (many of whom are foreign corporations or dmigr6s) and to introduce free market
mechanisms, its present population would be at a competitive disadvantage. Similar to the
Baltic case, Cuba should expect particularly negative results in the housing sector, including
widespread eviction of tenants.
Foster, supra note 50, at 649-50.
148. See Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 7, at 241-54; Alexander &
Mills, supra note 45, at 145-78.
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2. Reflections on Cuban Law and Cuba's Present State
The common justification for restitution of expropriated Cuban property
is that all the takings were illegal because the acts were conducted by an ille-
gitimate government and constituted transgressions against established prop-
erty law protections. 149 However, such arguments fail as the acts of revolu-
tionary governments are usually given credit once said government is in
complete control.15° While this may be so, the takings may be illegal based
on the very laws and actions promulgated by Castro himself. As noted
above, Judge Urritia declared that the 1940 Constitution would remain "the
law of the land."15' If this is true, the confiscation by Castro of any Cuban
property, without a decree by a court certifying the public purpose for which
the property was confiscated or the failure of the Castro government to pay
financial compensation for such taking, would be tantamount to an invalida-
tion of said taking. If the Fundamental Law of 1959 is considered the first
valid promulgation of law by the Castro government-despite the failure to
adhere to proper amendment procedures-such takings would nevertheless
be legally ineffective as compensation for such takings were still required
under Castro's own law but never paid. 152 Recalling that this article pre-
sumes Cuba will make a move towards democracy on its own accord, a post-
Castro Cuban government will likely invalidate such takings because an af-
firmation of the legitimacy of such takings could be viewed as a discrimina-
tory taking in violation of any foreseeable future property laws Cuba may
promulgate in addition to current international law. '53
Restitution is further substantiated by Cuba's Civil Code and its version
of adverse possession, known as usucapio,'54 which would disregard the
claims made by occupants of confiscated property and allow for restitution of
such property. The Spanish Civil Code, which served as the basis of Cuba's
149. Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 7, at 241-42.
150. Id. at 241.
This argument fails because the laws of a revolutionary regime that is fully in control and re-
ceives popular support are valid, regardless of the legitimacy of the regime. Also, as a practi-
cal matter, a blanket challenge to the Revolution's legislation is troubling, in that it implies that
all laws issued by the Batista regime after the 1952 coup d'dtat were invalid, as well as all laws
issued by several other de facto regimes that have ruled Cuba .... In short, a successful chal-
lenge to the validity of all post-1959 laws on the grounds of lack of constitutional legitimacy
by the enacting government could leave Cuba in a State of legal chaos and make it difficult for
the country to govern itself.
Id. at 241-42.
151. Adams, supra note 35, at 151.
152. Alexander & Mills, supra note 45, at 148.
153. Id. at 164.
154. Id. at 167.
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Civil Code defined two forms of adverse possession, "ordinary" and "ex-
traordinary."' 55 Under the former, "a possessor's legal right in land vested
only if he or she had possession of the land for an uninterrupted period of
twenty years and had no knowledge of other legal title to the land." 56 No
occupant of Cuban property would be able to satisfy these elements as the
Castro regime took possession of all residential property pursuant to the Ur-
ban Land Reform and the Constitution of 1976.157 The 1988 Cuban Socialist
Code further substantiated such a conclusion when it explicitly prohibited
adverse possession against the state. 58 Under these circumstances, an occu-
pant of expropriated property would not be able to raise a valid claim on the
property and attempt to prohibit restitution of such property. However, as
referenced above, special conditions should be placed on property inhabited
by Cuban citizens so as to avoid the potential for confrontations and evic-
tions. '9
The public policy reasons for enacting a remediation policy with a resti-
tution element far outweigh the legal conclusions from which such a policy
can be launched.
[R]estitution would have powerful symbolic value. It would mark
the advent of a new post-socialist era. It would formally repudiate
Marxist principles and schemes for state and collective ownership
and recognize, even exalt, private property rights. It would pro-
vide a moral as well as legal condemnation of the past. In so do-
ing, restitution would help a post-socialist Cuban government es-
tablish legitimacy in the eyes of the world community. This would
dovetail neatly with current Western rhetoric and policy, which
make progress toward "democracy" and a "free market economy"
prerequisites for foreign assistance and support. Restitution would
also advance the reconstitution of a Cuban national identity. It
would allow Cuba to emerge from the rubble of the world commu-
nist "empire" with a clearer sense of nationhood and national pur-
pose. It could promote reconnection with former citizens and ul-
timately lead to reintegration of dmigr6s into a single community
of Cuban nationals. Restitution could also help Cuba forge ties
with the United States. Because of its proximity, wealth, and in-
fluence, the United States has the potential to play a major role in
securing Cuba's economic future. Yet, until Cuba makes a mean-
ingful effort to recognize and satisfy outstanding U.S. claims for
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Alexander & Mills, supra note 45, at 150.
158. Id. at 167.
159. See, e.g., Ortiz, supra note 6, at 346.
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nationalized property, the United States is likely to continue to im-
pede rather than advance Cuban economic development. At the
very least, Cuban support for restitution could signal its willing-
ness to acknowledge and discuss U.S. claims. 1
60
Moreover, restitution should be the preferred remedy because "[a] tran-
sitional government in Havana. . .is not liable to have access to adequate
financial resources to pay compensation" at a large scale.' 6 1 Ironically, if
Cuba were to prefer compensation, it would likely need to secure a favorable
loan from the United States to make such payments and, when it is consid-
ered that most of the Cuban nationals that would receive such payments are
residents of the United States and would not prefer compensation, the United
States is not likely to grant the loan with the expectation of Cuba making
those payments. 162 The community of Cuban Nationals and Cuban Ameri-
cans armed with their newly restituted properties would likely be among the
first to return to the island nation and seek business and investment opportu-
nities and "jump-start" a newly established Cuban, free-market economy. 163
"However, if the property claims of the Cuban-American exile community
are left unresolved, their political and economic power could be turned
against stabilizing a new government in Cuba, much to the detriment not
only of the island, but also to potentially fruitful Cuba-U.S. relations. ' ' 64
Despite the doubt that arises regarding Cuba's ability to compensate
confiscated investors and property owners, "Cuba [nevertheless] possesses
the necessary human infrastructure and natural resources to attract . . . in-
vestment ... [armed with] many thousands of Cubans [who] are trained in
foreign languages, the advanced sciences, and math[] ... [the] great potential
for tourism, and vast energy resources."' 65 "As for its [natural] resources,
joint ventures in Cuba [in] nickel and cobalt industries brought in $1.3 billion
in 2005, while estimates of offshore oil reserves are at 5 billion barrels and of
natural gas reserves at 10 trillion cubic feet."' 166 In addition, in 1991, Cuba
instituted a policy which sought the development of renewable energy re-
160. Foster, supra note 50, at 649.
161. CREIGHTON REPORT, supra note 11, at 78.
162. See generally id.
163. Id. at 109-10.
164. Id. at 110.
165. Alexander & Mills, supra note 45, at 178.
166. Alex Davidson, After Fidel, FORBES, July 23, 2007, available at
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2007/0723/168.html.
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sources.167 "For many years Cuba's sugar mills have burned waste cane sol-
ids (bagasse) as fuel to power their boilers, but the process is inefficient due
to the age and condition of the turbines." '168 However, with the emergence
and prominence of sugar cane ethanol, as seen in places such as Brazil,'69
Cuba can once again turn to sugar cane to help establish a new industry in
Cuba and provide the economy with a much needed boost as it helps the
world wean off of fossil fuels.'70 The existence of these and other natural
resources further substantiated the direct restitution of property.
[F]ull restitution of all non-materially altered industrial, commercial
and agricultural properties to their legitimate owners will not only
carry out the justice required for social peace, but it will also place
the means of production in the hands of those entrepreneurs which
had elevated Cuba to the top of nearly every socio-economic index
in Latin America prior to the communist revolution. By creating
constitutional and other legal incentives to encourage the unleashing
of the creative energies of the Cuban people (both on the island and
in exile), Cuba can rapidly earn foreign exchange through exports,
produce abundantly for its own domestic consumption, employ
workers at real jobs paying in a currency that has value (unlike to-
day's Cuban peso), and restore labor rights. The economic multi-
plier effect of this combined economic activity will rapidly return
prosperity to the island. 171
Due to its location and natural resources, Cuba also attracts nearly two
million tourists a year which "will appeal to hotel companies and cruise op-
erators, as well as to corporate farmers in need of equatorial sunshine."' 172
Bottom line, Cuba is a blank canvas ready for the paint of investment from
international companies. Without the reinstitution of property rights, Cuba's
economy will never fully recuperate as is evident by the continued decline in
167. Jorge R. Pifion, Cuba's Energy Challenge: Fueling the Engine of Future Economic
Growth 17 (Inst. for Cuban & Cuban-Am. Stud. Occasional Paper Series, Mar. 2004), avail-
able at http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/Exploration.pdf.
168. Id.
169. See Joel K. Bourne, Jr., Green Dreams, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 2007, at 38. While
ethanol produced by corn only yields 1.3 gallons of ethanol to every gallon of fossil fuels used
in the process, the production of sugar cane ethanol is much higher with the production of
eight gallons of ethanol to every one gallon of fossil fuels. Id. To make the sugarcane ethanol
production even more efficient, production plants bum the aforementioned bagasse to power
their plants and, thus, do not even consume fossil fuels at any point in the process. See id.
170. Pifi6n, supra note 167, at 17.
171. Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 7, at 254-55 n. 131.
172. Davidson, supra note 166.
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the number of foreign companies investing and operating in Cuba.'73 "Joint
ventures between Cuba's communist state and foreign investors fell to 236 at
the end of 2006, down from 258 a year ago and 313 at the end of 2004."
174
This trend will likely continue until Cuba makes the initial steps towards a
free market society at which point it will have the capital and man power to
implement a flexible remedial policy such as the Step-Down Restitution Pol-
icy, which will work in tandem with the blossoming economy.
3. And Now a Word on International Law
International law serves both to justify a restitution policy as well un-
dercut the legitimacy of Castro's takings. "[T]he Cuban government main-
tains that" its confiscations of property belonging to individuals who left the
country for a specified time were appropriate as the property was abandoned
under Cuban law. 175 However, when it is considered that many Cuban citi-
zens fled Cuba due to fear of political persecution, international law dictates
such action did not constitute property abandonment. 
176
Necessity serves to protect a party against the consequences of a
wrongful act if the act was deliberately taken to safeguard an "es-
sential interest" of the party against a "grave and imminent peril."
The essential interests of individuals include their right to avoid po-
litical persecution. Similarly, an essential interest of a business en-
tity would be to avoid a state-imposed dissolution or expropriation
of its assets.' 
77
Moreover, general principles of international law allow citizens "to flee their
country in times" of revolutions when they are experiencing political perse-
cution without fearing that their property will be dispossessed. 178 Thus, the
taking of exiles' property under these principles should be construed as ille-
gal and merit the restitution of the expropriated property.
While international law does not specifically call for the restitution of
expropriated property, restitution can be deemed necessary to redress takings
according to the human rights model of international law, which considers
173. Reuters, Number of Foreign Firms in Cuba Fell in 2006, CANF, Jan. 29, 2007,
http://canfl.org/artman/publish/Other-news/Number-of foreign firnsinCuba fell in_200
6.shtml.
174. Id.
175. Alexander & Mills, supra note 45, at 164-65.
176. Id. at 165-66.
177. Id. at 166.
178. Id.
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the confiscation of property a violation of human rights.179 Justification for
restitution can only be inferred from international law, but international law
unequivocally calls for compensation for the expropriation of property be-
longing to foreigners. 8 ' Although compensation is generally thought to con-
stitute a fair market value payment for seized property, it is unclear exactly
what compensation standard to apply under international law. 181
Where a state takes possession of an enterprise [or property], as
through nationalization, two techniques for ascertaining fair mar-
ket value are "net book value" and "going concern value." The
former is a backward-looking approach that is based on the his-
torical prices of assets (preferably adjusted for inflation), less li-
abilities and depreciation. The latter is a forward-looking ap-
proach that relies upon an estimate of what future earnings [or
value] would have been absent the expropriation, discounted to
present value .... 182
Moreover, NAFTA's measure of compensation "is a restatement of...
basic ... American constitutional law of compensation."' 183 American law
also requires dispossessed property owners to receive fair market value for
their property; defining fair market value as "the amount that a willing buyer
would pay a willing seller of the property, taking into account all possible
uses to which the property might be put other than the use contemplated by
the taker."'' Regardless of the definition of compensation employed, the
price of compensation must be construed from circumstantial evidence and is
highly subjective, relying on the discretion of the administering body and
only constrained by a future restitution policy. 185 However, it is in this dis-
cretion where justification for restitution, or at least a policy that offers resti-
tution as a possible remedy, can be found because a compensation policy
employing such definitions would usually provide incomplete compensa-
tion, '86 failing to consider the benefits conferred to the former owner derived
with the seized property and any loss incurred by the former property owner
because of the taking. '87
179. See Pefialver, supra note 1, at 135.
180. See Ortiz, supra note 6, at 339. See also Merrill, supra note 71, at 110.
181. Merrill, supra note 71, at 113.
182. Id. at 113-14.
183. ld. at 115.
184. Id. at 116.
185. Id. at 119-20.
186. Merrill, supra note 71, at I 11.
187. Id. at 119.
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V. IMPLEMENTATION
The Step-Down Restitution Policy should be implemented by way of a
special tribunal or court established by agreement between the United States
and Cuba. Such an agreement must include a provision in which both coun-
tries commit "to act in good faith so as to promote the mutual prosperity of
their nations and citizens." 8 A post-Castro Cuban government must pledge
to create a special court to resolve all confiscated property claims "by Cuban
nationals who became nationals of the United States after the date of accrual
of such claims."'' 89 This court will have independent and limited jurisdiction
within the Cuban judicial system.' 90 In implementing the Step-Down Resti-
tution Policy, a future Cuban property claims court can turn to the lessons
learned in Iran and Ethiopia, where similar courts were introduced to handle
confiscated property claims.' 9
A. Lessons from Iran
In 1982, Iran and the United States established a dedicated tribunal for
the redress of property claims akin to the one needed in Cuba to implement
the Step-Down Restitution Policy. 1
92
The need for a claims tribunal in the case of Iran was prompted by
the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Forces acting in support of the
Ayatollah seized not only the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, but also
many privately held American assets. Correspondingly, the neces-
sity of claims tribunals in the case of Cuba was prompted by Cas-
tro's revolution in 1959, and the still-uncompensated property sei-
zures that went along with it. The two situations thus present simi-
larities in terms of the emotional and political aspects of the break-
down in relations.' 
93
Like the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, a future Cuban property claims
court implementing the Step-Down Restitution Policy will have to apply law
and policy in a flexible manner, granting jurisdiction over a series of claims
that arise in differing circumstances, taking law and policy from various
sources including Cuban and international law, and granting different redress
188. CREIGHTON REPORT, supra note 11, at 150.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 6.
191. Seeid., at 38-58.
192. Id. at 46.
193. CREIGHTON REPORT, supra note 11, at 38.
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depending on the circumstances.' 94 However, in issuing remedies, a future
Cuban property claims court should do well to consider that Cuba, unlike
Iran, has low-valued currency and limited or no funds with which to pay
compensation claims-claims that may include payment of the value of
property, interest, lost profits, and/or past unpaid rent.'95 As such, the pre-
ferred remedy of direct restitution should be granted where possible. An
important lesson Cuba can learn from Iran is that "much can be done with
informal structures and the good will of [the] participants."' 96 Because the
Step-Down Restitution Policy does not provide for the expulsion of tenants
and businesses on confiscated properties, informal mediations could facilitate
the settlement of property claims where the true owner simply seeks re-
institution of title and would be content with collecting rent from tenants on
the property. Given the proximity of Cuba to the United States and the size-
able Cuban/Cuban American population residing in the United States, rela-
tions with Cuba and the establishment of a Cuban property claims court will
not likely suffer the delays and set-backs faced in Iran given the limited cul-
tural boundaries and understood motivations amongst the groups with inter-
ests in Cuba.' 97
B. Lessons from Ethiopia
The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission is another example of a prop-
erty claims tribunal created by bilateral treaty. 98 While the Ethiopian Com-
mission was given broad jurisdiction-even so far as to include tort claims-
in a post war scenario, a future Cuban property claims court implementing
the Step-Down Restitution Policy may nevertheless find applicable case law
stemming from the Ethiopian court because of their stance on confiscated
property. '99 The Ethiopian Commission stated:
A belligerent is bound to ensure insofar as possible that the prop-
erty of protected persons is not despoiled or wasted. If private
property of enemy nationals is to be frozen or otherwise impaired
in wartime, it must be done by the State, and under conditions pro-
194. See id. at 40.
195. Id. at 38.
196. Id. at 39.
197. See id.
198. CREIGHTON REPORT, supra note 11, at 49.
199. Id. at 50-51.
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viding for the property's protection and its eventual disposition by
return to the owners or through post-war agreement. 2°0
Such a proclamation is at the heart of the Step-Down Restitution Policy and
should be at the heart of any remediation treaty, program, or policy imple-
mented by Cuba.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cuba will eventually take its first step towards the long road to a free
market society. In this endeavor, Cuba should implement the Step-Down
Restitution Policy as a means of achieving a prompt and efficient resolution
to hundreds of thousands of property claims. The presumptive remedy of
restitution will allow many Cuban exiles to take up their property and begin
to make improvements to it immediately with the resources they have
amassed while living elsewhere, mainly the United States. While situations
may arise where former property owners find occupants currently living on
the expropriated property, the Cuban government should take measures to
prevent conflict between the parties and the eviction of these individuals.
Given the poor housing sector, Cuba will likely have to implement legisla-
tion calling for the construction of affordable housing for Cuban Nationals
living on the island currently occupying confiscated property, who do not
have their own confiscated property to which to return. Restitution is most
appropriate for commercial properties which have undergone little or no
change during the Castro regime. Given its proximity to the United States,
Cuba will surely attract an enormous number of tourists from the United
States and will most likely become a "stop" on the itineraries of many vaca-
tion cruise lines, like Puerto Rico and the Bahamas. With the potential for
sudden interest in the country, Cuba will need to provide fast and efficient
remedies to corporate claimants. With the award of direct restitution, corpo-
rate claimants may immediately use their property or alienate their property
to corporations who have the resources and are ready to invest in industries
such as tourism and mining. The greatest strength of restitution is the sym-
bolism of the act. Restitution represents returning Cuba to its pre-
Communist days of individual success and economic prosperity.
The greatest strength of the Step-Down Restitution Policy, however, is
the flexibility afforded to the fledgling democratic Cuban Government in its
ability to award appropriate remedies on a case-by-case basis. With the
adoption of such a policy, a healthy body of case law will quickly be estab-
200. Id.
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lished and allow for the dispensation of property claims based on differing
scenarios. Although Cuba has limited land resources to offer in the form of
substituted restitution, varying forms of compensation coupled with restitu-
tion or alternative remedies will allow Cuba to adequately, efficiently, and
equitably handle confiscated property claims. The different types of claim-
ants which will approach Cuba seeking restitution and the various forms of
property expropriated during the Castro regime should force Cuba to avoid
applying a one-size-fits-all resolution to confiscated property claims. Such a
sweeping method aimed to settle all claims quickly will infuriate those on the
short end of the remediation arrangement. The Step-Down Restitution Pol-
icy, with its varying remedies, allows for former owners to seek justice for
Cuba's transgressions by allowing them to receive individualistic and equita-
ble remediation.
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